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Program theory and its use in evaluation seems to be an argument that just won’t 
go away—depending on which part of the world one is in. What is it about theory-
based evaluation (or the different understandings of it) that polarizes some but 
brings others together? A little digging shows that there are some serious 
misconceptions among both the program theory evangelists and the “theoro-
skeptics,” while some of the best innovations are coming from those who 
understand program theory’s potential and limitations and are just getting on with 
using it to move our discipline forward. 
1 Some of the ideas in this editorial are drawn in an earlier piece that appeared in the 2002 
edition of Mechanisms, the newsletter of the American Evaluation Association’s Program 
Theory and Theory-Driven Evaluation TIG.  
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The evaluation community in the United States has traditionally been divided into 
two camps—those who believe that theory-based evaluation is the wave of the 
future and that virtually all evaluations should be conducted in this way (e.g., 
Chen, 1994, 1996; Donaldson, 2003) and those who believe it to be a usually 
unnecessary addition of bells and whistles that fails to enhance the quality or value 
of evaluations (e.g., Scriven, 1994, 1997) or who think that it is simply a flawed 
approach to evaluation altogether (Stufflebeam, 2001).2  
In other parts of the world, such as Australasia and the UK (and perhaps others can 
comment on how things are in their part of the world), there has been quite a 
different discussion around program theory. In the conversations I hear, the focus 
has been not on whether program theory should be used in evaluation, but on how 
the multitude of different options can be used or not in particular cases, innovated 
on, and improved to maximize program theory’s value added (e.g., Pawson & 
Tilley, 1997; Rogers, 2000).  
As I look across the polarized spectrum, from the most ardent advocates of theory-
based evaluation (TBE) to its most critical critics, I can’t help but notice one 
thing—baggage. By this, I mean that those who have promoted TBE over the years 
have failed to keep the fundamental concept clear, but have instead loaded it up 
with all sorts of extras that reflect the way they happen to use it. These add-ons run 
the gamut, from wedding it to a particular analysis technique (such as structural 
2 There are, of course, a couple of other camps—those who show little interest in the debate, and 
a small number who are pushing hard to identify TBE's weaknesses and find innovative ways to 
address them. 
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equation modeling) to selling it as something far narrower than it is (e.g., an 
inherently participatory approach that seeks to uncover stakeholder theory).  
The inevitable result of the “baggaging” of theory-based evaluation has been that 
the critics have targeted not the fundamental idea behind TBE (which is actually 
really useful), but the particular “TBE + baggage” version they most strongly 
object to. Let’s take a few examples of criticisms to illustrate the point. 
I couldn’t help chuckling at yet another sideswipe at TBE in a recent chapter from 
Stufflebeam (incidentally, on a topic completely unrelated to TBE). Stufflebeam 
(2004) argued that “the now fashionable advocacy of theory-based evaluation” 
makes little sense because it “assumes that the complex of variables and 
interactions involved in running a project in the complicated, sometimes chaotic 
conditions of the real world can be worked out and used a priori to determine the 
pertinent evaluation questions and variables” (p. 253).  
I am quite certain that most users of theory-based evaluation would NOT claim 
that they had worked out in advance “the complex of variables and interactions 
involved in running a project.” In fact, most would wonder where on earth 
Stufflebeam got the idea that anyone thought this was possible. While I can’t speak 
for him, I can identify some contributions to the literature that might well lead 
someone to believe this was being claimed. Take, for example, Chen’s (1990) 
definition of program theory as “a specification of what must be done to achieve 
the desired goals, what other important impacts may also be anticipated, and how 
these goals and impacts would be generated” (p. 43). One could certainly be 
forgiven for thinking that Chen’s version of program theory has almost crystal 
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ball-like properties that allow it to predict any and all potential side effects as well 
as the mechanisms by which they (and any main effects) will occur.  
It is quite true that, in the process of developing program theory, the critical 
thinking exercise involved quite often leads the evaluators (and others working 
with them) to identify a number of potential side effects that might not have 
otherwise occurred to them. So, it is easy to see the source of Chen’s claim. But it 
is just as easy to see that the statement can be construed as meaning that evaluators 
using program theory effectively would always be able to identify any important 
side effect, nor the mechanism by which it occurs. Let’s call this the Crystal Ball 
Baggage. 
The above quote from Chen also identifies a second piece of unnecessary baggage 
that seems to accompany theory-based evaluation—that it is, by definition, a goal-
based evaluation approach. It is true that most exercises in developing program 
theory start with the question “What is the program trying to achieve here?” 
Particularly if stakeholders are involved in theory development, the content of the 
program theory inevitably skews itself toward intended consequences. As Chen 
implies in his definition, program theory can be used to systematically identify 
potential side effects. But the important point is that it is actually possible to do 
goal-free theory-based evaluation (Davidson, 2000, 2004). The fact that most 
program theories begin with intended consequences (or goals, if any have been 
formally stated) does not mean that theory-based evaluation, by definition, takes 
that approach. So, we also need to uncouple TBE from its Goal-Based Baggage. 
Probably the most pervasive of all of TBE’s accompaniments is something we 
might call Stakeholder Involvement Baggage. For example, Donaldson (2003) 
 
http://evaluation.wmich.edu/jmde/  Editorial 
Journal of MultiDisciplinary Evaluation (JMDE:4) 
ISSN 1556-8180 
vii
describes program theory as “a common understanding [developed between the 
evaluator and stakeholders] of how a program is presumed to solve the social 
problem(s)” (p. 114). To be fair, Donaldson also lists a range of other sources of 
information that can be used to build a solid program theory, but he (like so many 
other theory-based evaluators) seems to be quite consistent in the extent to which 
he promotes stakeholder involvement in program theory development.  
Don’t get me wrong here. Stakeholder involvement in the development of program 
theory is an incredibly powerful method for providing the kinds of insights that can 
drive needed change, whether that is program improvement, program replacement, 
or something else. While a good ‘black box’ evaluation can give a conclusion 
about whether or not a program is effective or worthwhile, we know from the 
literature (and our experience) with organizational change that there is often very 
strong resistance to believing a negative conclusion. And in many cases, programs 
are not as effective as they might be because all or part of them are based on 
flawed assumptions (or, more often, highly questionable logical leaps, or no logic 
at all) about why they should work. The “let’s discover this together” approach is 
far more effective for getting people to see with their own eyes why something 
doesn’t work and therefore needs to be changed or abandoned. Put another way, 
participatory theory-based evaluation is one of the most powerful tools we have for 
‘organizational unlearning’ (i.e., getting people to stop believing something that is 
untrue and has been leading them to be less effective in their work).  
The drawback of the Stakeholder Involvement Baggage occurs when examples of 
theory-based evaluation or descriptions of how it is best done are almost 
exclusively participatory in nature. This leads critics to believe that TBE cannot be 
used in non-participatory mode, and therefore is of no use in situations where the 
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contract, legislatory requirements, and/or the political climate require a clearly 
independent, impartial evaluation. Again, this is not true. TBEs can absolutely be 
done in a non-participatory mode, even if this isn’t the preferred approach of most 
practitioners. 
The final piece of unnecessary baggage that so often tags along with TBE is the 
Hypothesis Testing Baggage. It is well known that one group that gravitates 
strongly toward theory-based evaluation are the ‘quantoids’—social scientists with 
high levels of expertise in and preference for quantitative methods. Through 
quantoid glasses, a program theory logic model looks just like something that 
should be plugged into a structural equation model, thereby yielding a fit index. If 
the model ‘fits’ the data (p < .01), the program is deemed effective, albeit in the 
careful “the evidence appears to tentatively support the hypothesis…” kind of way.  
TBE’s Hypothesis Testing Baggage is actually a lot more problematic than the 
other kinds of baggage. Although, in the right hands, it can be extremely useful, 
many of the examples I have seen fall into some insidious traps. The most common 
trap is remembering to evaluate the theory but forgetting to evaluate the actual 
program. The fact that certain variables are associated with each other might give 
us some hint that the underlying theory behind the program may not be completely 
off base, but it fails to tell us whether the magnitude of any program impacts were 
substantial enough to make a difference to anybody’s lives, let alone whether the 
value of the impacts were worth the cost of implementing the program. Put simply, 
many hypothesis testing approaches to theory-based evaluation are not really 
evaluations at all; they are research projects.  
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I am sure there are plenty of other types of baggage that go along with theory-
based evaluation; I have simply plucked out a few that I find to be most 
problematic. But the main point is this. Wherever there is baggage, the critics tend 
to attack the baggage rather than the approach itself. Or, as Pawson and Tilley 
(1997) put it: 
We know from long, long experience in trying to develop research 
practice that methodological positions can become ‘badges of 
honour’. One can easily be misunderstood, debating positions tend to 
become foreclosed too early, and straw men and red herrings galore 
litter the path to progress. (p. xiv) 
So, what should we do about the baggage, the red herrings, and the straw men?  
I would like to argue for a concerted effort to strip down useful evaluation 
concepts and approaches to their bare bones so that it is easy for all to see what the 
approach entails and what the potential add-ons are (or are not). Elsewhere I have 
used a deliberately ‘bare bones’ definition of theory-based evaluation as “any 
evaluation that uses program theory or program logic as its guiding framework” 
(Davidson, 2004, p. 248). Program theory is simply a description of the mechanism 
by which a program achieves (or is expected to achieve) its effects (p. 38).  
I also like the way Rogers, Petrosino, Huebner, and Hacsi (2000) clearly explain 
what is in and what is out of their definition: 
We consider [Program Theory Evaluation] to have two essential 
components, one conceptual and one empirical. PTE consists of an 
explicit theory or model of how the program causes the intended or 
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observed outcomes and an evaluation that is at least partly guided by 
this model. This definition, though deliberately broad, does exclude 
some versions of evaluation that have the word theory attached to 
them. It does not cover all six types of theory-driven evaluation 
defined by Chen (1990) but only the type he refers to as intervening 
mechanism evaluation. It does not include evaluations that explicate 
the theory behind a program but do not use the theory to guide the 
evaluation. Nor does it include evaluations in which the program 
theory is a list of activities, like a “to do” list, rather than a model 
showing a series of intermediate outcomes, or mechanisms, by which 
the program activities are understood to lead to desired ends. (pp. 5-
6).  
Note that the above definitions include no assumption that outcomes are derived 
from program goals,3 or that the theory would be able to predict side effects, or 
about where the theory comes from (e.g., stakeholders, the literature), or how the 
theory is tested. These elements are deliberately left open in recognition of the 
diversity of ways in which practitioners actually use evaluation. And this is the 
way it should be. 
3 The term “desired ends” in Rogers et al.’s (2000) definition could be construed as referring to 
goals; however, the beginning of the definition clearly and deliberately states that outcomes in 
program theory may be intended or observed. To my mind, the reference to desired ends simply 
reflects the broader observation that most program theories include outcomes that are implied by 
the very nature of the program or of its participants or their documented needs (e.g., reduction in 
violent offending as an outcome for a cognitive behavioral program delivered to violent 
offenders).  
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I know that readers who subscribe to EVALTALK and some of the various 
evaluation listservs around the world probably roll their eyes every time yet 
another discussion comes up about the meaning of key terms such as evaluation, 
research, theory-based evaluation, and so forth. But unless we can get these 
fundamentals right, we can end up being distracted by the baggage and—more 
importantly—not making use of a potentially valuable approach simply because 
someone has erroneously defined “the way it is” (i.e., its essential and 
distinguishing nature) as “the way I happen to do it.”  
As evaluators, we need to keep a critical eye on this habit of using our own job 
descriptions as [supposedly universal] definitions, as well as definitions that omit a 
crucial element (e.g., explaining what a key term such as ‘evaluation’ means). 
After all, how many times have we seen something like this: “Evaluation is defined 
as the process of working collaboratively with stakeholders in social programs to 
identify their questions and then apply social science research methodologies to 
answer those questions, for the purpose of program improvement”? Interesting 
description of a particular individual’s consulting practice, but a definition it is not, 
let alone a baggage-free one! 
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